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Thesis Summary: Western Christian groups are losing significant numbers of adherents 
in the area formerly known as Christendom (Western Europe and European-dominated 
former colonies), a trend which seems to be quickening with time. In addition, the same 
Western Christian denominations are in the midst of an unprecedented period of 
fragmentation, with many splitting over questions of doctrine and practice. More 
controversially, traditionalists both within the Western churches and outside of them 
have claimed that the Western denominations are also experiencing a qualitative 
decline, asserting that the Christianity of the West has been doctrinally compromised. 
This thesis posits an underlying philosophical reason for this decline, one which is 
associated with work of the Enlightenment thinker René Descartes. Through a historical 
survey of Christian anthropology and analysis of human faculties, this thesis will 
establish the centrality of doctrines concerning human capacities in Christianity and 
demonstrate why a change to them would almost inevitably lead to decline.
4
Introduction: Whatʼs Wrong with the Christian West?
The modern world is a post-Christian world; that is, the West no longer celebrates 
values which have traditionally been promoted by the Christian religion nor is it 
overwhelmingly Christian in belief.1 A recent survey conducted by the Pew Forum in the 
United States found a 5% decline in the number of responders claiming adherence to 
Protestant denominations in a five year span, while Roman Catholic responses fell by 
1% and religiously unaffiliated responses rose by 4.3%.2 In England, one of the 
historical bastions of Christendom, 59% of the population identified as Christian during 
the 2011 census, a decline of 12% from the 2001 census.3 That 59%, however, does not 
reflect the number of churchgoers on any given Sunday; only 1.4% of Britons are 
thought to be regular attenders of church services.4 The churches themselves are not 
ignorant of this change; the Roman Catholic Church recently launched a marketing 
campaign entitled “Catholics Come Home” in a bid to lure lapsed Catholics back into the 
pews. 
" In addition to the dramatic decline in the overall number of adherents, many 
Protestant groups appear to be in the midst of an unprecedented period of conflict and 
fragmentation. The state of Lutheranism in North America is a perfect example of the 
5
1 In this text, the term “West” is used to indicate the countries of Western Europe and their former 
colonies in which the majority of their populations traditionally identified as Christians. For example, the 
United States of America and Australia are counted amongst the West, but India and Singapore are not. 
2 "ʼNonesʼ on the Rise." Pew Research Centers Religion Public Life Project RSS. N.p., 9 Oct. 2012. Web. 
6 Feb. 2014.
3 "What Does the Census Tell Us about Religion in 2011?" Changing Religious Affiliations in England and 
Wales. Office for National Statistics, 16 May 2013. Web. 6 Feb. 2014.
4 "Empty Churches." Dear Ephesus. People of Mars Hill, n.d. Web. 6 Feb. 2014. <http://
dearephesusdotcom.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/empty-churches1.pdf>.
extreme tumult facing many Western Christian churches. Tensions over the role of 
social justice movements in the church, the value of traditional Lutheran Confessions 
and orthodox Biblical interpretation have led to no fewer than thirty-six separate 
Lutheran Churches in the United States and Canada, many of which have appeared 
only in the last two decades. Other Protestant denominations in America have fared little 
better; former Episcopalian (now Anglican) congregations in Virginia and South Carolina 
have recently been locked in bitter lawsuits with The Episcopal Church concerning 
ownership of their churches and property.5  It seems unlikely that the accelerating 
decline in adherence and marked increase in denominational in-fighting are 
unconnected, but it would be a mistake to assume that one explains the other. Rather, 
they seem to be pointing to a deeper source of discontent, a greater underlying 
problem; in the words of Marcellus, they seem to suggest that “something is rotten” in 
the Christian West. 
" One might argue, quite controversially, that the underlying problem for Western 
Christianity is a qualitative decline, that the churches of the Christian West have lost an 
essential aspect of their identity. This is not merely a sentiment expressed by those 
outside of Western churches; traditionalist Roman Catholics, for example, worry that the 
Second Vatican Councilʼs mission to overcome “anti-Modernist neurosis”6  compromised 
6
5 Haley, Sharron. "St. Matthias Joins Lawsuit against The Episcopal Church."The Sumter Item. The 
Clarendon Sun, 15 Jan. 2013. Web. 8 Feb. 2014.
6 This was apparently the succinct explanation of the councilʼs mission given by none other than Fr. 
Joseph Ratzinger, later to become Pope Benedict XVI. 
Komonchak, Joseph A. "The Church in Crisis." Commonweal Magazine. 26 May 2005. Web. 8 Feb. 2014.
the integrity of the Church, effectively adulterating central doctrines and practices.7 The 
idea of a recent “fall” is not limited to traditionalist Catholics; Peter Leithart, a minister 
and theologian in the Presbyterian Church in America,  offered the following 
assessment of modern Western Christianity in First Things: “...Christian faith no longer 
provides the moral compass, the sacred symbolism, or the telos for Western institutions. 
Americaʼs Protestant establishment has collapsed. Neither evangelical Protestants nor 
Catholics nor a coalition of the two are poised to replace it. Christian America was real, 
but, whatever its great virtues and great flaws, it is gone, and the slightly frantic 
experiments have failed to revive the corpse. Itʼs past time to issue a death certificate.”8
Great change has occurred in Christendom over the last few decades, that much is 
beyond dispute; exactly why this change has occurred, on the other hand, is quite 
unclear. 
" A popular line of thought traces the present state of Christianity to the period of 
Western history sometimes called the Enlightenment9 and argues that the philosophical 
and scientific advancements of that age created an unprecedented environment of 
freedom. In this new world, one in which novel ideas were able to flourish, the 
7
7 “Vatican II can be described as a turning point in the history of the Catholic Church... After the Second 
Vatican Council, she described herself as ʻdynamic,ʼ ʻprogressive,ʼ a ʻnew Church,ʼ and a ʻChurch of our 
times.ʼ She claimed to be adapting herself and Christʼs message to the conditions of the modern world.
But she sent out a mixed message. In the face of the drastic modernizations  introduced, she also 
claimed that “nothing essential was changed” and that “she was only returning to primitive practice.” 
While many accepted these assertions without thought, others found them self-contradictory. The net 
result was a confusion of loyalties which the subsequent forty-five years have done little to alleviate.”
 -Rama Coomaraswamy
"The Problem: Is It The Same Church?" World Wisdom. World Wisdom, n.d. Web. 9 Feb. 2014. <http://
www.worldwisdom.com/public/viewpdf/default.aspx?article-title=The_Problem--
Is_It_The_Same_Church_by_Rama_Coomaraswamy.pdf>.
8 Leithart, Peter J,. "Micro-Christendoms." First Things. First Things, 11 Apr. 2014. Web. 11 Apr. 2014.
9 The validity of this title is highly questionable, as is the use of the phrase “Dark Ages” to refer to the time 
between the fall of Rome and the equally contentious Italian “Renaissance”. 
intellectual elite found that life outside of the church was simply more attractive than the 
prospect of arguing in the forums within it. Over time, the general population followed; 
after centuries of power, people were tired of being under the churchʼs control. The end 
result of this process, such an argument claims, is modernity, an age without a 
dominant faith. 
" This hypothesis appears to be incomplete, and in parts, grossly inaccurate. It 
fails to provide an answer to some of the main features of the modern religious 
landscape; most notably, the frequency of church schism. In the opinion of the author, it 
also attributes a greater novelty to the Enlightenment than historically justifiable. The 
Enlightenment was indeed a time of great philosophical diversity, but this atmosphere 
was far from unique; the Middle Ages, as any reader of medieval philosophy knows, 
was far from being a time of intellectual unity. 
" Though it may be inaccurate, it would be wrong to conclude that the 
“Enlightenment thesis” is devoid of value; on a very basic level, it is simply too general. 
Rather than issuing the overarching claim that “novel ideas” led to a societal shift away 
from religious adherence, is it possible to pinpoint a central idea or concept that sparked 
the decline? Is it possible to trace that idea to a particular person or group? Finally, is it 
even feasible to suggest that a single idea could change the world so dramatically? 
" This thesis will attempt to answer those very questions. I hope to show that a 
change in attitudes concerning the faculties of the human person, and the response of 
many Western churches to that change, seems to have a direct connection to the 
decline of Christianity in the modern West. Although the Enlightenment philosopher 
René Descartes is best known for advocating an ontological dualism, I believe that his 
8
estimation of the faculties of the human person had a far more profound effect on the 
subsequent history of Western Christianity. By exploring the way in which human 
composition has been understood throughout Christian history, I will attempt to 
demonstrate a connection between philosophical anthropology, theological doctrines 
and the current decline in numbers of adherents. It is this connection that I believe 
offers a compelling explanation for why persons who have never read Descartes or 
engaged in a philosophical examination of human faculties would nonetheless share his 
views and, perhaps, reject organized religious practice because of them. 
9
Section I: The Role of Personhood in Christianity
" Before beginning an examination of the historical trajectory of anthropology in 
Christianity, it is necessary to make explicit the central role played by the concept of 
personhood in the Christian religion. The proof of this centrality is quite easy to provide: 
the very tenets that distinguish Christian religions from non-Christian religions (the 
doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation) are essentially beliefs about the personhood of 
God.
 " The first quintessentially Christian doctrine is the doctrine of the Trinity, of God as 
three distinct persons. Though this formulation is hinted at in the New Testament 
(Matthew 3:16-17 & 28:19 can be taken as reliable signposts; 1 John 5:7 should not be 
considered reliable), it is not made explicit in any of the Scriptures.10 It is only with the 
Nicene Creed, written at the First Council of Nicaea in 325, that God is explicitly 
identified as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.11 
" It should be made clear that although Christians affirm that God is three persons 
of one essence, describing exactly what a Divine person is is extremely difficult. The 
classic definition of a person provided by Boethius, “an individual substance of a rational 
nature”12, seems to be incompatible with the notion of the Trinity being of “one 
essence”.13 St. Thomas Aquinas adopted Boethiusʼs definition of person and modified it 
10
10 There are indications, however, that a lack of belief in the Trinity was considered heretical in the early 
church, as suggested by the excommunication of Sabellius (c. 220).
11 "Symbolum Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum - Greek." The Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan Creed. Creeds of 
Christendom, n.d. Web. 12 Feb. 2014. <http://www.creeds.net/ancient/niceneg.htm>.
12 Boethiusʼs definition need not be interpreted as excluding the prospect of supra-rational knowledge.
13 Aquinas, Thomas. "Question 29. The Divine Persons." SUMMA THEOLOGICA: The Divine Persons 
(Prima Pars, Q. 29). New Advent, n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
in order to describe a Divine hypostatsis, calling the persons of the Holy Trinity 
“...relation[s] subsisting in the Divine [i.e. uncreated] nature.”14 The general consensus 
amongst Christian churches, however, is that the exact nature of Divine personhood, 
even the Trinity itself, is mysterious; St. Jerome wrote, “The true profession of the 
mystery of the Trinity is to own that we do not comprehend it.”15
" The doctrine of the Incarnation, the second central belief of the Christian religion, 
identifies Jesus Christ as both fully God and fully man. Though it seems that Jesus 
makes explicit claims to divinity in the New Testament,16 fierce debate occurred 
amongst Christian bodies concerning Christology for the first three centuries of the 
religion. The first four Ecumenical councils, called to end this infighting, were essentially  
concerned with personhood: the relationship between human and Divine personhood 
(Nicaea), the possession of a human mind by the Divine (Constantinople), the possibility  
of union between God and man (Ephesus), and the interaction of wills in Christ 
(Chalcedon).17 
" Personhood can thus be confidently said to lie at the heart of the Christian 
religion; central doctrines concerning the nature of God in Christianity would be 
unintelligible without reference to the concept of personhood. Man, made in the “image 
and likeness” of God, bears enough resemblance to his Creator to engage in some sort 
11
14 Aquinas, Thomas. "Question 40. The persons as compared to the relations or properties." SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA). New Advent. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
15 Schaff, Philip. "NPNF2-06. Jerome: The Principal Works of St. Jerome."Christian Classics Ethereal 
Library. Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
16 John 8:58 is often provided as a key proof for Christʼs claims to divinity. 
17 "The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Orthodox Church." The Greek Orthodox Church of the Holy 
Cross - Studies in the Faith. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
of relationship with Him.18 This is the central implication of Divine personhood: as 
persons are beings that can be known in a way distinct from the knowledge of a fact, 
God (being three persons) can also be known in a way that is above the level of fact. 
But what sort of “knowledge” can one have of God? Which faculty does man employ to 
know God? What would a Church that ceased to emphasize this sort of knowing look 
like? In order to answer these questions, questions which will begin to depict the nature 
of changes in the Christian West, a more in-depth look at Christian history, and some 
pre-Christian history, is necessary. 
12
18 This phrase is a combination of statements made in Genesis 1:26 & 1:27
Section Two: In the Beginning
" Discussions about the human person in early Christianity did not occur in a 
philosophical vacuum; attempts to uncover manʼs nature and abilities began centuries 
before the birth of Christ. The history of philosophical anthropology in the West 
stretches back to the Pre-Socratic philosopher Thales, often called “the father of Greek 
philosophy”. While claiming that the fundamental substance of the universe was water, 
Aristotle recounts in De Anima that “...Thales also thought that all things are full of 
gods.”19 The resulting perspective on human composition need not be interpreted as 
dualistic; perhaps Thales thought of “water” much more expansively than the modern 
person. Pythagoras is one of the first philosophers known to have spoken directly about 
the concept of a soul, by which he seems to have meant a persisting substance that is 
an individual consciousness. Xenophanes, another Pre-Socratic, wrote of Pythagoras: 
“Once, they say, he was passing by when a puppy was being whipped, and he took pity 
and said: ʻStop, do not beat it; it is the soul of a friend that I recognized when I heard its 
voice.ʼ”20 It is thus clear that by the time of Socrates (the fifth century before Christ), 
some Greeks had constructed a picture of the soul that included a persisting sense of 
“self” during life, a continuation of that identity after death and the possibility of 
metempsychosis. 
" Plato greatly expanded on the concept of soul (ψυχή) in the Republic, the 
Phaedrus and the Phaedo. Line 435C of the Republic indicates that Plato conceived of 
13
19 "Thales." The First Philosophers of Greece. Ed. Arthur Fairbanks. Hanover Historical Texts Project, 
June 2013. Web. 25 Feb. 2014.
20 Lorenz, Hendrik. "Ancient Theories of Soul." Stanford University. Stanford University, 23 Oct. 2003. 
Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
the soul as a plurality, as consisting of multiple parts. He aligns the three parts of the 
soul with peoples in the ancient world: the “high spirit” corresponds to Thracians, 
Scythians and the love of wisdom or reason to the Athenians and the love of pleasure to 
Phoenicians and Egyptians.21 The just person, Plato claims, is the one who maintains a 
balance within himself, with reason guiding the spirit and appetite. The exact capacities 
attributed to reason are somewhat unclear. Reason22  is, of course, the faculty which 
discerns goodness and directs the other parts of the soul, but whether or not Platoʼs 
Logistikon is confined to rational judgements in the Republic remains up for debate. 
" The Phaedrus, however, seems to claim explicitly that the soul is capable of 
perceiving Reality as it is, albeit only once it is removed from the body. Plato writes of 
the winged soul seeing a, “...region above the heaven [which] was never worthily sung 
by any earthly poet, nor will it ever be... For the colorless, formless, and intangible truly 
existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, holds this region and is 
visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul.”23 
" In both the Phaedrus and the Phaedo, Plato identifies the soul as an immortal 
entity and the body as a sort of prison. Socrates, speaking to Simmias in his last 
moments, indicates that the soul actually benefits from death by asking, “And what is 
purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the 
habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out of all the courses of the 
14
21 Plato, and Benjamin Jowett. "The Internet Classics Archive | The Republic by Plato." The Internet 
Classics Archive | The Republic by Plato. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Mar. 2014.
22 Reason henceforth will be used to refer to the process by which one moves from premise to 
conclusion. 
23 Plato, and Benjamin Jowett. "The Internet Classics Archive | The Republic by Plato." The Internet 
Classics Archive | Phaedrus by Plato. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Mar. 2014.
body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as 
she can; the release of the soul from the chains of the body?”24
" Much more could (and has) been written about Platoʼs ideas concerning human 
composition, particularly the division and actions of the soul, but for the purposes of this 
thesis it is important only to note further the impact his ideas had on early Christianity. 
Though certain books in the New Testament suggest that the leaders of the early 
Church held a rather lukewarm view of philosophers (Acts 17, in which St. Paul speaks 
on “The Unknown God”, includes the following jibe: “For all the Athenians and strangers 
which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new 
thing.”25), many within it were more than willing to praise the merits of Greek philosophy. 
" St. Justin the Martyr (d. 165) saw significant similarities between Christian 
doctrine and the philosophy of Socrates, leading him to make the following statement: 
“We have been taught that Christ is the first-born of God, and we have declared above 
that He is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers; and those who lived 
reasonably are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as, among the 
Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them...”26 In The First Apology, the work 
from which that excerpt was drawn, St. Justin also affirms the teachings of Pythagoras, 
Socrates and Plato on the persistence of the soul after death. St. Justin was not an 
isolated example in the early Church; St. Clement of Alexandria and St. Augustine, 
15
24 Plato, and Benjamin Jowett. "The Internet Classics Archive | The Republic by Plato." The Internet 
Classics Archive | Phaedo by Plato. N.p., n.d. Web. 2 Mar. 2014.
25 Acts of the Apostles 17:21
26 "The First Apology." CHURCH FATHERS: (St. Justin Martyr). New Advent, n.d. Web. 5 Mar. 2014.
amongst others, are also recorded as accepting the veracity of Platonic thought on 
some aspects of the soul.27
16
27 For instance, its persistence after biological death. 
Section Three: Philosophical Anthropology in the Bible
" St. Justin did not pass judgement on the Greek philosophers arbitrarily, but 
considered their work in relation to the collected teachings of the Christian religion. The 
primary source for St. Justinʼs anthropology was, of course, the Bible. Far from being 
unambiguous sources, the Old and New Testaments provide a meandering account of 
human nature and composition, one which forces a reader to connect a number of 
disparate statements in order to arrive at a coherent picture. 
" The first reference to manʼs composition in the Christian Scriptures occurs in the 
second chapter of the Book of Genesis, where it is written that “...the Lord God formed 
man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man 
became a living soul.”28 This statement is deceptively complex; it is not at all clear if the 
breath of God instills another nature within the human or if it is simply the property of 
motion (more akin to Aristotleʼs conception of the soul). Even more basically, the 
distinction between the nature of “the dust of the ground”, the source of man, and “the 
Lord God” is not drawn out in a satisfactory manner, leaving the reader to make an 
assumption concerning their distinction.
" A later passage in Genesis again refers to the nature of man without providing 
any real clarification. Genesis 3:19, set in the midst of Adam and Eveʼs dismissal from 
the garden, reads, “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the 
ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.”29 
17
28 Genesis 2:7
29 Genesis 3:19
Like the previous passage, this excerpt also suffers from a lack of particularity; is the 
breath of God mentioned in Genesis 2:7 not to be understood as “a part” of humans? 
Does the author hold in mind any distinction of levels in human composition (body and 
soul, soul and spirit, etc.)? The language of the passage is purely terrestrial, so is the 
reader to understand that humans are simply collections of dust?
" If the previous passages seem to suggest a stark division between the nature of 
God and human nature, what is to be made of the claim made in Psalm 82, “...Ye are 
gods; and all of you are children of the most High”?30 This statement, paired with 
another Genesis verse (“So God created man in his own image, in the image of God 
created he him...”31), raises man far beyond mere dust; by virtue of being made in the 
Image of God, he is himself a god. 
" The title does sound nice, but what, exactly, is a god? The punctuation of the 
verse indicates a qualitative difference between a god and God. One can quite easily 
come up with a list of distinctions: “gods” are created, limited in knowledge and less 
than omnipotent, whereas God is none of those things. While not elevating humans to 
the very top of the chain of being, the title does seem to provide some sort of dignity or 
power intrinsic to humans that the earlier passages did not emphasize. With the 
preceding passages in mind, it seems that picture of humanity that the reader is 
provided places the human person a bit above mud and a bit beneath God. If “gods” are 
different than God, as it seems reasonable to conclude, what sort of family resemblance 
exists between humans and their Maker?
18
30 Psalm 82:6
31 Genesis 1:27
" Perhaps the clearest answer is to be found in the instructions of Christ: “Be ye 
therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.”32 Perfection is a 
unique quality of God; to be perfect simply means to be God, or, at very least, to be 
completely with God. As the first “way” of being perfect is generally regarded as 
unattainable,33 given manʼs not being God, but gods, it must be concluded that man has 
the ability to be completely with God.34 
" In sending his disciples out in the tenth chapter of the Gospel of Matthew, Christ 
may provide a clue to the faculty man employs to be with God. Whilst shoring up the 
resolve of the Apostles, Christ says, “And fear not them which kill the body, but are not 
able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in 
Hell.”35 Aside from being a great incentive to not fail in their appointed task, this 
statement to the Apostles is notable as one of the first clear indications that humans are 
composite beings. It is important, however, not to read too much of oneʼs own 
prejudices into this verse, as the precise functions of the soul and body are not made 
clear by Christ. He only says that the soul can be destroyed in Hell, leaving many 
19
32 The Gospel of Matthew 5:48
33 Even the Palamite concept of theosis seems to leave some distinction between the being uncreated 
from all eternity (Christ) and beings who become uncreated. 
34 To those who say that Christ is commanding in jest, C. S. Lewis has an emphatic reply: “The command 
ʻBe ye perfectʼ is not idealistic gas. Nor is it a command to do the impossible. He is going to make us into 
creatures that can obey that command. He said (in the Bible) that we were “gods” and He is going to 
make good His words. If we let Him—for we can prevent Him, if we choose—He will make the feeblest 
and filthiest of us into a god or goddess, dazzling, radiant, immortal creatures, pulsating all through with 
such energy and joy and wisdom and love as we cannot now imagine, a bright stainless mirror which 
reflects back to Him perfectly (though, of course, on a smaller scale) His own boundless power and 
delight and goodness.” 
Lewis, C. S. Mere Christianity. New York: Macmillan, 1958. 173-74. Print.
35 The Gospel of Matthew 10:28
questions about it unanswered. What exactly the soul and body do, and how the 
faculties are divided between them, remains mysterious. 
" After an overview of the Old Testament and the Gospels, it is only clear that man 
is an amalgam, both dust and god, body and soul, capable of acting and perceiving 
God. St. Paul, writing in the Epistle to the Romans, was perhaps the first within the 
Christian tradition to attempt a further clarification of manʼs substance and faculties. In 
the seventh chapter of that book, he writes, “...with the mind (νοι) I myself serve the law 
of God; but with the flesh (σαρκι) the law of sin.”36 A person has (at least) a mind and 
flesh that seem to be distinct, as Christ indicated in the Gospel of Matthew, but a clear 
statement concerning the activities of these components is, again, absent. 
Is rationality a property of the mind or the flesh on St. Paulʼs account? If the act of 
voluntary service requires some sort of rationality, and St. Paul is voluntarily serving 
God with the mind and sin with the flesh, then it would appear that both the mind and 
the flesh can be said to participate in rationality. 
" In the light of St. Paulʼs comments in the Epistle to the Romans, what is one to 
make of his account in 2 Corinthians 12:2-4: “I knew a man in Christ above fourteen 
years ago, whether in the body, I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell: 
God knoweth; such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man, 
whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth; How that he was 
caught up into paradise, and heard unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man 
to utter”?37 The faculty employed in this experience does not seem to be either the sort 
20
36 The Epistle to the Romans 7:25
37 The Second Epistle to the Corinthians 12:2-4
of mind or flesh that is laid out in Romans. Could it be that St. Paul (generally 
interpreted to be the man in the account) did not mean to limit a Christian anthropology 
to a simple mind/flesh dichotomy? 
" Many questions concerning the composition of the person remain unanswered 
after a reading of the Bible, even after God Himself has spoken on the topic! Neither 
Christ nor St. Paul, however, were particularly interested in constructing a systematic 
theology of the Christian religion. It was with the first attempts at crafting such a system, 
undertaken by men like Origen of Alexandria, St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Augustine, 
that more concrete answers on the question of human faculties began to emerge.38
21
38 After the writing of this thesis, it emerged that an explicit reference to human composition being three-
fold is included in 1 Thessalonians 5:23. This fact, however, does not clarify the picture of human faculties 
that the Bible intends to convey, but, to the contrary, merely muddies the water even further. 
Section Four: The First Systematic Theologians
" If Origen of Alexandria (184-254) was not the first systematic theologian of the 
Christian religion, he was very nearly so. Born in Alexandria to Christian parents and 
educated in the Hellenic tradition, Origen sought to work the many philosophical 
statements within the Scriptures into a cohesive system of thought. On First Principles, 
his groundwork of the Christian religion, covers the entirety of created history (including 
things which are yet to come!). Stretching from the foundations of the world and reasons 
for the fall to the possibility of universal reconciliation, the work is remarkable in both its 
breadth and depth. Most importantly for this thesis, however, is the detailed 
investigation of human personhood and capacities that Origen undertakes across the 
books in On First Principles.
" Origen is famous (or infamous, depending on oneʼs point of view) for claiming 
that the soul of a person necessarily precedes the body. Though the veracity of this 
conception can be debated, the making of such a bold claim forced Origen to delineate 
the properties and capacities of a person. Rather than continue to propagate an image 
of persons as bodies and souls, however, he partitioned man into a tripartite being: a 
body, a soul and a mind. 
" In order to provide a contrast for the composition of man, Origen first identifies 
the properties of God. In Book I of On First Principles, he writes, “God therefore must 
not be thought to be any kind of body, nor to exist in a body, but to be a simple 
intellectual existence, be believed to have in himself a more or less, but is Unity, or if I 
may so say, Oneness throughout, and the mind and fount from which originates all 
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intellectual existence or mind. Now mind does not need physical space in which to 
move and operate, nor does it need a magnitude discernible by the senses, nor bodily 
shape or color, nor anything else whatever like these, which are suitable to bodies and 
matter.”39 The “mind” of which Origen writes seems to be a different faculty entirely from 
the “mind” referenced in the Epistle to the Romans insofar as it appears to be supra-
rational, above the rationality.40 In fact, the mind of St. Paul bares much more 
resemblance to Origenʼs idea of soul, “...an existence possessing imagination and 
desire... capable of feeling and movement.”41 It is important to note that the soul in 
Origenʼs thought does not seem permanent; in Book II of On First Principles, he writes, 
“...when the mind departed from its original condition and dignity it became or was 
termed a soul, and if ever it is restored and corrected it returns to the condition of being 
a mind.”42
" The average person on Origenʼs account can thus to be taken as a body and 
soul, with the potential for cultivating mind. The soul, via its possession of imagination, 
desire, feeling and movement, is conceived of as the rational portion of the person, 
while the body seems to be the physical vessel which is directed by the soul. The most 
succinct expression of Origenʼs anthropology comes in the sixth chapter of Book II, in a 
description of Heaven. In Heaven “...the rational being, growing at each successive 
stage, not as it grew when in this life in the flesh or body and in the soul, but increasing 
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39 Origen, George W. Butterworth, and Henri De. Lubac. On First Principles: Being Koetschau's Text. 
Gloucester, MA: Smith, 1973. PDF.
40 Again, if one also includes St. Paulʼs comments in 1 Thessalonians 5:23, perhaps he simply used the 
term “mind” to mean different things in different contexts. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid.
in mind and intelligence, advances as a mind already perfect to perfect knowledge, no 
longer hindered by its former carnal senses, but developing in intellectual power, ever 
approaching the pure and gazing ʻface to faceʼ, if I may so speak, on the causes of 
things.“43 The end to which man must strive, then, is this “face to face” encounter with 
God, an act which is not accomplished by the body or soul, but by the mind.
" Though Origen and some teachings associated with him subsequently fell under 
a cloud of suspicion from Church authorities, his thoughts on the faculties of the human 
person greatly influenced a number of figures within the early church, especially a group 
referred to as the Cappadocian Fathers. Amongst the Cappadocians, St. Gregory of 
Nyssa (335-395), in particular, devoted a substantial amount of energy to philosophical 
anthropology. His famous On The Making of Man is entirely dedicated to explicating the 
place of humans in the world, from the particular features of bodies to the growth of 
souls. St. Gregory was in accordance with Origen on the ability of man to “see” God; he 
wrote that humans were able to perceive God with the faculty of mind, or as he 
alternately refers to it, the “spirit”. 
" In the eighth section of On The Making of Man, St. Gregory writes, “...as we are 
taught the like thing by the apostle in what he says to the Ephesians, praying for them 
that the complete grace of their ʻbody and soul and spiritʼ may be preserved at the 
coming of the Lord; using, the word ʻbodyʼ for the nutritive part, and denoting the 
sensitive by the word ʻsoul,ʼ and the intellectual by ʻspirit.ʼ Likewise too the Lord instructs 
the scribe in the Gospel that he should set before every commandment that love to God 
which is exercised with all the heart and soul and mind: for here also it seems to me that 
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the phrase indicates the same difference, naming the more corporeal existence ʻheart,ʼ 
the intermediate ʻsoul,ʼ and the higher nature, the intellectual and mental faculty, 
ʻmind.ʼ”44 It could be argued that his division between “soul” and “mind” is a distinction 
between higher and lower mental functions; that is, forms of rationality. Statements 
made by St. Gregory in his Life of Moses, however, suggest otherwise. In the chapter 
on the Burning Bush, St. Gregory writes, “ In my view the definition of truth is this: not to 
have a mistaken apprehension of Being. Falsehood is a kind of impression which arises 
in the understanding about nonbeing: as though what does not exist does, in fact, exist. 
But truth is the sure apprehension of real Being. So, whoever applies himself in 
quietness to higher philosophical matters over a long period of time will barely 
apprehend what true Being is, that is, what possesses existence in its own nature, and 
what nonbeing is, that is, what is existence only in appearance, with no self-subsisting 
nature.”45 
" This is a truly momentous statement: St. Gregory has, in essence, declared 
knowledge of true Being to be essentially impossible to attain with oneʼs rational 
faculties.46 “Not to have a mistaken apprehension of Being”, therefore, cannot be taken 
merely to mean having a proper collection of facts or rational premises. It seems to 
indicate that Christʼs references to “knowing the truth” (“And ye shall know the truth, and 
the truth shall make you free.”47) are, in fact, directed not towards the activities of the 
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44 "On the Making of Man." CHURCH FATHERS: (St. Gregory of Nyssa). New Advent, n.d. Web. 16 Mar. 
2014.
45 Gregory of Nyssa. "The Life of Moses." The Life of Moses. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. <http://
academic.mu.edu/phil/jonesj/courses/P222/p22220062NyssaMoses.pdf>.
46 Though, perhaps, the philosopher will have some vague ideas about true Being that do, in fact, line up 
with Reality. 
47 The Gospel of John 8:32
rational mind, but instead exhort the “knowing” of the spirit, the faculty which knows God 
non-discursively. 
" Though comments such as these are perfectly normal (that is, orthodox) by the 
standards of Eastern Christianity, both ancient and modern, Western Christians might 
find themselves wary of such claims. Is it necessary, or even acceptable, to talk about a 
faculty capable of perceiving God? If such an anthropology was the standard for the 
early Church, why would it not have been discussed by the Western Fathers? As it turns 
out, even the man considered by many to be the father of mind-body dualism, St. 
Augustine of Hippo, held some notion of a supra-rational faculty in human persons, one 
which is able to perceive God directly. "
" The tenth book of St. Augustineʼs Confessions is often held up as a paradigmatic 
example of anthropological dualism; indeed, with epistemological comments like “I the 
inner knew them; I, the mind, through the senses of my body”,48 it seems that the 
Bishop of Hippo limits the concept of knowledge to processed sensory experiences. The 
discussion of the role and extent of memory in Book X seems to confirm this sentiment, 
leaving many modern scholars to assume St. Augustine was a sort of proto-Cartesian. 
Such an assessment, however, ignores perhaps the most important conclusion of that 
particular section of the Confessions: that knowledge of God is found neither through 
the senses nor the memory.49 Concluding memory to be insufficient for the knowledge 
of God, St. Augustine writes, “Where then did I find Thee, that I might learn Thee? For in 
my memory Thou wert not, before I learned Thee. Where then did I find Thee, that I 
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48 Augustine of Hippo. "Confessions of Saint Augustine." Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, n.d. Web. 22 Mar. 2014.
49 “The senses” refer to the empirical faculties (sight, taste, touch, hearing, taste) and “memory” refers to 
the ability to recollect instances of sensory input. 
might learn Thee, but in Thee above me? Place there is none.”50 If St. Augustine, after 
devoting so much time to explicating the domain of the senses and memory, concludes 
that God is not to be known by either, is he in effect declaring God to be unknowable?
" The answer to that question is an emphatic “no”. Book VII of the Confessions 
seems to dispel both the notion that St. Augustine was purely a mind-body dualist and 
the idea that he believed God to be beyond all knowledge. In Chapter 17 of Book VII, 
St. Augustine writes in almost Origenian terms of the “upward trajectory” involved in the 
experience of God.51 In arriving at knowledge of “that which is”, St. Augustine finds 
himself moving from the use of body to soul to “intelligence”. Intelligence can be 
surmised to be a faculty distinct from the reason or memory based on St. Augustineʼs 
account of coming to know the Truth; in saying that it occurred in a “flash of a trembling 
glance”, that is, instantaneously, it seems fair to conclude that the faculty is non-
discursive. The description of the faculty and its object is brief, but not surprisingly so; 
nothing can be phrased rationally concerning the supra-rational. Perhaps the most 
surprising observation one can make concerning St. Augustineʼs anthropology in the 
light of Book VII is how very much like Origenʼs it can appear. By demonstrating the way 
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51 “For, inquiring whence it was that I admired the beauty of bodies whether celestial or terrestrial, and 
what supported me in judging correctly on things mutable, and pronouncing, “This should be thus, this 
not,”—inquiring, then, whence I so judged, seeing I did so judge, I had found the unchangeable and true 
eternity of Truth, above my changeable mind. And thus, by degrees, I passed from bodies to the soul, 
which makes use of the senses of the body to perceive; and thence to its inward faculty, to which the 
bodily senses represent outward things, and up to which reach the capabilities of beasts; and thence, 
again, I passed on to the reasoning faculty, unto which whatever is received from the senses of the body 
is referred to be judged, which also, finding itself to be variable in me, raised itself up to its own 
intelligence, and from habit drew away my thoughts, withdrawing itself from the crowds of contradictory 
phantasms; that so it might find out that light by which it was besprinkled, when, without all doubting, it 
cried out, “that the unchangeable was to be preferred before the changeable;” whence also it knew that 
unchangeable, which, unless it had in some way known, it could have had no sure ground for preferring it 
to the changeable. And thus, with the flash of a trembling glance, it arrived at that which is.”
Ibid. 
in which the tasks of the body and soul are self-evident in every rational being, but the 
faculty of “mind” or “intelligence” must actively be pursued in order to be known, St. 
Augustine seems to hold an anthropology similar to the one developed by Origen two 
centuries prior.52 It is worth emphasizing that  St. Augustine did see the intelligence as a 
faculty which could be refined systematically, i.e. the experience of God could be 
cultivated in human persons.
" Having briefly analyzed St. Augustineʼs anthropology, a pattern has become clear 
in the early Churchʼs thoughts on the composition of man. The first systematic 
theologians of the Christian religion, despite disagreeing with one another on points of 
doctrine and practice, seem to be univocal in asserting that man to possesses the ability 
to perceive God (which will henceforth be referred to as “nous” or “intellectus”53). As 
demonstrated by its presence in the works of both St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. 
Augustine, it is reasonable to claim this doctrine to be neither “eastern” nor “western”, 
but a basic component of Christianity proper. 
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52 St. Augustine did, of course, differ from Origen in denying the possibility of metempsychosis or 
transmigration, but this does not detract from the beliefs they shared. 
53 It should be made clear that the use of the term “intellectus” in this paper refers to a very specific 
faculty, one which allows for the non-discursive knowledge of God. The term intellectus has been used for 
thousands of years to refer to a wide variety of things; Roger Bacon, for example, wrote frequently of the 
“active intellect” but meant something quite distinct from a non-discursive faculty. Even those who do 
seem to accept this faculty, including Meister Eckhart, continue to make use of the term “intellectus” to 
refer to certain rational capacities or activities.
Section Five: The Medievals
" Between the death of St. Augustine in 430 and the end of the first millennium, the 
idea of a Christian anthropology remained relatively unexplored in Western Europe. 
Figures like Boethius (who, as it was mentioned earlier, claimed persons to be an 
individual substance of a rational nature) intermittently grappled with the division of 
faculties in the Latin-speaking lands, but, on the whole, discussions of anthropology 
remained in the domain of Eastern Christian thought. Writers in the Christian East like 
St. Maximus the Confessor (580-662) and St. Symeon the New Theologian (949-1022) 
continued to investigate the particular faculties of the human person, with St. Symeon, 
in particular, advocating the supra-rational experience of God as a necessity for oneʼs 
spiritual life. St. Symeon affirmed the noetic faculties present in human persons, writing, 
“He... who is united to God by faith and recognizes him by action is indeed enabled to 
see Him by contemplation... His mind itself is light and sees all things as light, and the 
light has life and imparts light to him who sees it.”54 Within St. Symeonʼs writings are the 
same features concerning the experience of God that are present in Origen, St. Gregory 
of Nyssa and St. Augustine: the language of trajectory (“Let us flee from the deceit of life 
and its supposed happiness... Let us endeavor to see Him and contemplate Him even in 
this life.”55), the affirmation of a special capacity within man capable of experiencing 
God directly and the idea that such an experience can be cultivated rather than 
occurring randomly. 
29
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n.d. Web. 27 Mar. 2014.
55 Ibid. 
" Though the early Medieval West produced little in the way of explicit treatises on 
inner knowledge or human composition, the omnipresent metaphor of the journey 
served to communicate many of the same themes. The Irish monastics, in particular, 
practiced physical exile (and intentional exploration, in the case of St. Brendan the 
Navigator) in order to achieve an interior silence. Perhaps the greatest of the Medieval 
Irish writers, John Scotus Eriugena, differed substantially from the average Western 
thinker at the time insofar as he specifically addressed manʼs faculties and nature. 
" In the Periphyseon, Eriugena boldly claims that “...just as the Divine Essence is 
infinite, so human substance made in Its image is bounded by no definite limit.”56 
Though this claim can be viewed as a grandiose expression of human capabilities, it is 
merely a reassertion of the claim from Genesis 1:26-27, of manʼs being in the “image 
and likeness” of God. The path to knowledge of God is, for Eriugena, a process that 
begins with the search for self-knowledge. “And this is the greatest and perhaps the 
only step towards knowledge of the truth,” he wrote, “namely, that human nature should 
first know and love itself and then refer the whole of its knowledge of itself and the 
whole of its love of itself to the glory and love and knowledge of the Creator.”57 It would 
be a mistake to understand Eriugena to be claiming that complete self-knowledge can 
be had outside of the knowledge of God; rather, it seems that his intent is to make 
explicit the real intimacy possible between “gods” and God. 
" Eriugena was, however, one of the last Westerners to express such ideas in such 
bold terms. Around the beginning of the second millennium, the educational centers of 
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56 Moran, Dermot. "Nature, Man and God in the Philosophy of John Scotus Eriugena." University College 
Dublin. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Mar. 2014. <https://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Moran_Scotus%20Eriugena%20on
%20Nature,%20Man,%20&%20God.pdf>.
57 Ibid. 
Western Christendom began to recover the works of Aristotle accompanied by the 
interpretations of Muslim philosophers like Avicenna and Averroes. With Aristotelianism 
came a greater emphasis on argument being grounded in empirical claims; 
philosophers like Peter Abelard used this platform to assert empirically grounded 
rationality as the supreme way of knowing in human beings, capable of explaining all 
aspects of human nature and experience. While few philosophers in the Middle Ages 
were as radical as Abelard in their enthusiasm for the capacity of rationality, the support 
for Aristotelianism forced all subsequent thinkers in the Western tradition to temper their 
assertions regarding human faculties with a cursory nod to Aristotelian psychology.
" St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) perhaps allows the modern reader the best 
look into the changing nature of Western philosophy. The student of the equally 
impressive Albertus Magnus, Aquinas attempted a complete exposition of the Christian 
religion in his Summa Theologica, which, by necessity, included a sizable inquiry into 
human nature and capacities. Question 79 of the Summa deals with the place of the 
intellect in the human person; Aquinas concludes that rather than existing as the 
essence of the soul or a separate faculty altogether, the intellect should be considered 
merely as a power of the soul.58 In this regard, Aquinas represents a departure from the 
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58 “...it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. 
For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation 
itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His 
action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in 
other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.” 
Aquinas, Thomas. "Question 79." SUMMA THEOLOGICA. New Advent, n.d. Web. 1 April. 2014.
earlier voices within the tradition by depending on a rational argument to establish an 
anthropology.5960 
" Something here must be said of all rationalist criticisms of the doctrine of the 
nous or intellect; that is, all are equally guilty of category error. It seems fair to assert 
that the faculties of human persons are hierarchically ordered. The emotions, by virtue 
of being sub-rational, are able to be comprehended and ordered by the rationality; 
Humeʼs proposal to let the emotions control the rationality is so radical precisely 
because it inverts the traditional hierarchy. The intellectus, said by Origen and the early 
systematic theologians to be a supra-rational faculty, is thus clearly above the full 
comprehension of the rationality. To claim that belief in the existence of the nous or 
intellectus is dependent upon the rationality being able to comprehend it is even more 
egregious than demanding oneʼs sense of touch “prove” the existence of rationality. A 
supra-rational faculty must be experienced in order to be “proven”; how could one 
validate any other faculty save by its use? 
" This mistake, the mistake of the Medievals, in time became the error of the 
Enlightenment, though it should be noted that persons roughly contemporaneous with 
Aquinas in both the East and the West continued to advocate for the concept of the 
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59 The views expressed through the Summa, however, should not necessarily be understood as the 
terminal beliefs of Aquinas. A popular anecdote to Aquinasʼ later life explains the reason: “On the feast of 
St. Nicholas [in 1273, Aquinas] was celebrating Mass when he received a revelation that so affected him 
that he wrote and dictated no more, leaving his great work the Summa Theologiae unfinished. To Brother 
Reginaldʼs (his secretary and friend) expostulations he replied, ʻThe end of my labors has come. All that I 
have written appears to be as so much straw after the things that have been revealed to me.ʼ When later 
asked by Reginald to return to writing, Aquinas said, ʻI can write no more. I have seen things that make 
my writings like straw.ʼ” 
Frye, Peggy. "Quick Questions." When St. Thomas Aquinas Likened His Work to Straw, Was That a 
Retraction of What He Wrote? Catholic Answers, n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2014.
60 His faith in the accuracy of Aristotle on almost all matters (evidenced by his frequent nods to “The 
Philosopher”) is considered by the author a regress in Western thought. 
intellectus. Foremost amongst those in the West was the German mystic Eckhart von 
Hochheim, generally referred to as Meister Eckhart (1260-1327). Eckhart belonged to 
the generation of Dominicans immediately following St. Thomas Aquinas, yet where 
Aquinas was disinclined to speak of the intellectus in great detail, Eckhart wrote 
extensively on the ability of man to know God. 
" Though some modern writers61 have suggested that the intellectus in Eckhart is 
not a distinct faculty, it seems difficult to reconcile the rationality with the powers of the 
intellectus. As Eckhart himself wrote, “There is something in the soul that is uncreated 
and uncreatable. If the whole soul were of such a nature, it would be uncreated and 
uncreatable. And this is the intellect.”62 If the intellectus is understood as being a part of 
the soul in Eckhartʼs anthropology, it must be concluded that its mode of “being a part” 
is extraordinarily different from the normal associations between person and capacity 
(i.e. One might say “my sense of sight” or “my point of view” in reference to a subjective 
capacity, but it would seem incorrect to refer to the action of the intellectus as being the 
property of a particular person). 
" Shortly after the death of Eckhart in the West, a dispute concerning the human 
ability to know God arose in the Christian East. The Hesychast Controversy of the 
fourteenth century pitted the contemplative practices of the monks on Mount Athos 
against the philosophical perspectives of a Western-influenced monk, one Barlaam of 
Calabria (Sicily). The Athonite monks, “led” by Gregory Palamas, the Bishop of 
Thessaloniki, contended that the practice of hesychasm (from the word ἡσυχία, 
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62 Maurer, Armand. "Medieval Philosophy." Google Books. Google, n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2014.
meaning “stillness” or “silence”) allowed one to interact with the uncreated energies of 
God. Barlaam denied this claim, saying that human were capable only of perceiving 
created energies. A series of synods held from 1341 to 1353, sometimes referred to as 
the Ninth Ecumenical Council, affirmed the uncreated energies of God to be within the 
scope of the nousʼ perception; the essence of God, however, was agreed by both 
parties to be forever outside of the realm of human knowledge.63 
" The Bishop of Thessaloniki was celebrated for his triumph, becoming St. Gregory 
Palamas soon after dying, while Barlaam returned to Sicily and became a Bishop in his 
own right. The church that elevated the Sicilian monk to the episcopate was not, 
however, centered in Constantinople; Barlaam was received into the Roman Catholic 
Church in 1342.64 This event, perhaps more than any other, has created a dichotomy in 
the mind of the Christian East related to the practice of contemplation: the East affirms 
contemplative prayer to be a way to know God, while the West, by virtue of appointing 
Barlaam to a position of power, appears to deny the claim.65 The year of Barlaamʼs 
investiture as Bishop of Gerace, 1342, thus serves as a decisive point of departure for 
the understanding of human capacities in the Christian East and West.66 
34
63 The division between the uncreated essence of God and uncreated energies, though accepted by both 
parties in the Hesychast Controversy, is the topic of some skepticism in both ancient and modern 
sources.
64 "Barlaam of Calabria." - OrthodoxWiki. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2014.
65 This perspective is, of course, a biased one; one can be a Bishop for many reasons outside of 
philosophical ideology. The spiritual/rational dichotomy between East and West has stuck and is, however 
skewed it may be, held by a large number of Orthodox Christians with whom the author has come into 
contact. 
66 One might question why, if the East & West seem to have held different anthropologies by 1342, 
Barlaam of Calabria is not deemed the “chief antagonist” of this thesis. To briefly answer such an 
objection, it should be noted that Barlaam, while denying the possibility of experiencing God directly, did 
not also deny that things in general could be known. It is Descartesʼ solipsistic emphasis that separates 
him from Barlaam and ultimately proved more influential to modern Western thought. 
Section Six: The Invention of the Modern Man
" Before proceeding to a criticism of René Descartes, it would be helpful to 
summarize the preceding sections in order to make explicit the extent to which his 
philosophy (and, by a process of intellectual osmosis, the philosophy of the average 
Westerner in the present day) radically reduces the capacities of human persons. It has 
been shown that Western thinkers since pre-Christian times conceived of human 
persons as beings capable of attaining a certain flourishing across several realms, 
including the intellectual or spiritual realm. Since the time of Plato, and perhaps even 
earlier, it had been affirmed that a specific capacity for experiencing God non-
discursively was necessary to achieve this spiritual flourishing. Up until the late Middle 
Ages, these ideas seem to have been recognized as relatively orthodox amongst 
thinkers in the Christian West. 
" The counter-intuitively named “Renaissance”, which began in Italy during the 
fourteenth century, included paradigm shifts in the study of philosophy. The changes in 
philosophical assumptions that developed during that period can be traced, with some 
certainty, to the source of most Renaissance “innovations”: money. The rise of large 
scale trade in the Mediterranean during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries gradually 
upset the prevailing balance of civil power across the continent, with the newly 
influential trading classes exercising their economic muscle through patronage. While 
this process has been the focus of myriad studies, many of them interesting in their own 
right, the main source of interest for this thesis is the effect such a financial windfall had 
on the prevailing conception of philosophical anthropology. 
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" The most immediate influence this economic shift had on the practice of 
philosophy in the West was its cleaving of the majority of intellectual life from the 
Church. No longer was the Church (and by extension, the Universities, where students 
were considered wards of the Church) the originator and disseminator of ideas; rather, a 
young man with a philosophical disposition could turn to a secular patron in order to 
support his ideas and establish himself amongst the intellectual elite.67
" Of course, being outside of the Churchʼs patronage (that is, outside of the 
Churchʼs pocket) meant that one was, to some degree, outside of the reach of the 
Churchʼs censorship. In centuries past, philosophers like Meister Eckhart, and even St. 
Thomas Aquinas, had been threatened with charges of heresy for their positions; as 
both men were monastics, and thus dependent on the Roman Catholic Church for their 
livelihood, such threats were taken quite seriously. Philosophers in the Renaissance 
and Enlightenment periods, though still subject to social censure, were free to make 
claims that were out of line with Christian orthodoxy, and in many cases, practical 
reasonableness without the threat of direct punishment. 
" René Descartes was born into this changing world, as the Renaissance in 
France began to peter out and before the Enlightenment period. It has been suggested 
by some, quite plausibly, that Descartes himself was the chief agent responsible for the 
emergence of the Enlightenment; the timeline of his life does nothing to diminish the 
validity of such a claim. After a varied early life in which he studied mathematics, 
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67 Others, like Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, were direct beneficiaries of the changing financial situation 
as members of the aristocracy served as their own patrons. 
physics, law and military science, Descartes experienced “visions” or dreams in 1619 
that led him to begin the formulation of a new philosophical system.68 
" The first decade or so of his philosophical career was mostly concerned with 
natural philosophy, particularly the study of physics. It was Descartesʼ later forays into 
epistemology and philosophical anthropology, however, that have defined his legacy 
amongst philosophers and theologians. The famous Discourse on the Method lays bare 
the first principle of Descartesʼ philosophy: “...no sooner had I embarked on this project 
[to reject all assumptions about truth] than I noticed that while I was trying in this way to 
think everything to be false it had to be the case that I, who was thinking this, was 
something. And observing that this truth ʻI am thinking, therefore I existʼ was so firm and 
sure that not even the most extravagant suppositions of the skeptics could shake it, I 
decided that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was 
seeking.”69 It should be noted that some philosophers have, in fact, rejected the validity 
of the cogitio,70 as Descartesʼ claim is known, insisting that the step from thought to 
existence requires at least one further premise.
" Descartesʼ philosophy, particularly as it relates to the mind and body, is further 
expounded in his Meditations on First Philosophy. As with the Discourse, the 
Meditations represents a sharp departure from previous philosophy in the West, 
especially on how knowledge is acquired. Rather than agree with the Platonic notion of 
anamnesis (a remembrance or recalling to mind), Descartes argues that, “I remembered 
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69 Descartes, René. "Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting Oneʼs Reason and Seeking Truth in 
the Sciences." Early Modern Texts. N.p., 2007. Web. 5 Apr. 2014.
70 Soren Kierkegaard notably includes such a criticism in his Philosophical Fragments. 
that I had the use of my senses before I ever had the use of reason; and I saw that the 
ideas that I formed were, for the most part, made up of elements of sensory ideas. This 
convinced me that I had nothing at all in my intellect that I had not previously had in 
sensation.”71 This claim should make even the novice philosopher suspicious; how 
exactly does Descartes move from a sample of ideas (“the most part”) to a claim about 
all of the ideas ever formed by human persons with such surety? 
" Some scholars of Descartes might claim that the previous conclusion is a 
misreading of the Meditations, pointing out that Descartes identifies three sorts of ideas 
(innate, adventitious, factitious) in his Third Meditation.72 Oneʼs conception of being a 
“self”, for example, could be thought of as an innate idea, as could the knowledge of 
Godʼs existence. Towards the end of that Meditation, Descartes writes of God, “The only  
remaining alternative is that my idea of God is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is 
innate in me. It is no surprise that God in creating me should have placed this idea in 
me, to serve as a mark of the craftsman stamped on his work.”73 This, one might argue, 
is clear proof that Descartes has a distinction of ideas and that he accepts ideas can 
originate without sensory experiences.  
" Such an objection, however, fails to take into account the structure of the 
Meditations. The text is to be read as a work-in-progress; that is, the conclusions of the 
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72 “Among my ideas, some seem to be innate, some to be caused from the outside, and others to have 
been invented by me. As I see it, my understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is, 
derives purely from my own nature, which means that it is innate; my hearing a noise or seeing the sun or 
feeling the fire comes from things outside me; and sirens, hippogriffs and the like are my own invention. 
But perhaps really all my ideas are caused from the outside, or all are innate, or all are made up; for I still 
have not clearly perceived their true origin.”
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first day are to be considered less firm than those of the second day and so on. 
Descartes entertains the concept of innate ideas on the third day, but his statement 
concerning sensory experience is in the Sixth Meditation. The original claim about the 
source of knowledge in Cartesian philosophy, then, seems validated because of its later 
place in the sequence. The subsequent arguments for God that Descartes makes in the 
Meditations also seem to support the notion that he sees all ideas as deriving from 
sense experience, as they are created in relation to his own finite nature. It seems 
appropriate, when considering the Meditations in their entirety, to conclude that 
Descartes is not declaring innate ideas to be real, but offers them up as a possibility to 
ultimately dismiss. 
" The main tenet of Descartesʼ anthropology is an ontological dualism. The person, 
in Descartesʼ system of thought, is a compound being made of “mind” and “body”. The 
constituent parts of a person were not equally valuable, as Descartes makes clear in the 
Meditations, writing, “...my mind is me, for the following reason. I know that I exist and 
that nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I am a thinking thing; 
from this it follows that my essence consists solely in my being a thinking thing, even 
though there may be a body that is very closely joined to me.”74 One may have a body, 
but a human person is a mind, according to Descartes. 
" The Cartesian contribution to philosophical anthropology can thus be 
summarized in this way: A human person is a combination of mind and body, the latter 
of which is essential to human nature. All knowledge is ultimately derived via a bottom-
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up process of sensory experience and rational reflection. The only conclusion which one 
can state with any certainty is that one exists; all else must be held as a “proximal” truth. 
" From the theological writers featured in this thesis up to this point, myriad 
objections could be raised to this account of the nature and capabilities of human 
persons. In many respects, Descartesʼ sketch of human faculties is perhaps the most 
restricted or reduced account of personhood yet seen. The most apparent point of 
contention between Descartes and the traditional Christian seems to be the manner in 
which the self is known. For Descartes, true “self-knowledge” is the product of a rational 
exercise, of applying a stringent skepticism to oneʼs beliefs about the self until one 
reaches an undeniable principle, as displayed in his Meditations. 
" The theologians of the Christian tradition, on the other hand, seem to have a 
different view of the attainment of self-knowledge. St. Gregory of Nyssa explicitly stated 
that “...whoever applies himself in quietness to higher philosophical matters over a long 
period of time will barely apprehend what true Being is,” meaning that Reality could not 
be known outside of communion with the Divine, even if one engaged in protracted 
philosophical exercises. By virtue of omission, Descartes seems to deny the existence 
of the faculty of intellectus, the non-discursive faculty of knowing. Whereas the separate 
faculty of intellectus is denied or disputed in some authors prior to Descartes (as in the 
works of Eckhart, some would argue St. Augustine, etc.), it had hardly been denied 
during the Christian era that one could, nonetheless, know God.75 As Descartes makes 
quite plain, the only thing one could be sure of within his system is oneʼs own existence, 
effectively denying that God could be known. 
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" Of course, it is possible that one might read Descartes in a different light. One 
might argue that the preceding argument is simply over-extended; Descartesʼ lack of 
discussion of the nous or intellectus is simply not the same as flatly denying its 
existence. He very well could have believed in its existence and simply refrained from 
examining it, or perhaps saw it as self-evident and therefore beyond the need to make 
explicit. 
" Such criticisms would, however, miss the entire point of Descartesʼ philosophy: in 
the Meditations he seeks to make all assumptions or beliefs explicit and thus open to 
philosophical examination. The fact that Descartes doesnʼt engage in the Meditations 
even once with a knowledge of God that is non-discursive suggests that he sees a 
concrete knowledge of God as outside of the realm of possibility. Heʼs willing to suggest 
that God could be a deceiver (though he refutes it) and that God is not all-powerful (also 
refuted), but heʼs simply unable to fathom that one might know God. A contemporary of 
Descartes, Blaise Pascal, openly criticized the philosopher for his reduction of the role 
played by God, writing, “I cannot forgive Descartes; in all his philosophy he did his best 
to dispense with God. But he could not avoid making Him set the world in motion with a 
flip of His thumb; after that he had no more use for God."76
" The proofs of God offered by Descartes differ quite extensively from those 
produced by earlier Christians like St. Anselm; whereas the Archbishop of Canterbury 
derived his famous ontological argument during prayer and considered it a means for 
leading people to communion with God (“...[contemplation] casts aside cares, and 
excludes all thoughts save that of God, that it may seek Him. Man was created to see 
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God.”77), Descartesʼ “proofs” were the independent product of a rational mind for other 
rational minds.78 Cartesian proofs for Godʼs existence have no “trajectory”; that is, they 
do not force one to act, but merely act as the presentation of a rational fact. The original 
claim, that Descartesʼ silence on the intellect and knowledge of God seems to imply a 
lack of belief in either, thus seems validated. The fact that no explicit denunciation of the 
faculty of intellectus or general knowledge of God is present in the works of Descartes 
does not suggest he assented to them, but rather shows that the philosopher believed 
he had already removed the possibility of their existence from his system of thought. 
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Section Seven: Descartes & Early Protestantism
" It appears that René Descartes introduced an anthropology to Western 
audiences that departed significantly from early Christian thought on the capacities of 
the human person. It was previously stated that Descartes was born at a historical 
crossroads, between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. It is now necessary to 
add a third component to that picture: the Protestant Reformation. 
" Descartes, born almost eighty years after the publishing of the Disputatio Pro 
Declaratione Virtutis Indulgentiarum, more commonly known as The Ninety-Five 
Theses, was a generation or two behind the major figures of the Reformation (Luther, 
Calvin, Zwingli, etc.). It is clear that the Reformation leaders before Descartes appear to 
have very little association with the kinds of ideas that Descartes would come to 
formulate. John Calvin (1509-1564), for example, wrote to the first topic that “...it is 
evident that man never attains to a true self-knowledge until he have previously 
contemplated the face of God, and come down after such contemplation to look into 
himself,”79 while to the second he claimed, “That there exists in the human minds and 
indeed by natural instinct, some sense of Deity, we hold to be beyond dispute, since 
God himself, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all men with 
some idea of his Godhead...”80 Though clearly not sharing Cartesian assumptions about 
human capacities, it remains unclear if Calvin believed in a non-discursive faculty by 
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which one might see God.81 Martin Luther (1483-1546), the man whom many regard as 
the father of the Protestant Reformation, certainly did not share Descartesʼ faith in the 
abilities of reason, as he is recorded in the the Table Talk to have said, “Reason is the 
greatest enemy that faith has; it never comes to the aid of spiritual things, but—more 
frequently than not—struggles against the divine Word, treating with contempt all that 
emanates from God.”82 
" Neither Luther nor Calvin seem to have been mystics, but there were persons of 
a mystical disposition active in the early Reformation churches. Perhaps most famous 
amongst them was the Lutheran Jakob Böhme (1575-1624), whoʼs The Way To Christ 
includes the following account of union with God: “When thou standest still from the 
thinking of self, and the willing of self; when both thy Intellect and Will are quiet and 
passive to the impressions of the Eternal Word and Spirit; when thy soul is winged up, 
and above that which is temporal with the outward senses and the imagination being 
locked up by Holy Abstraction; then the Eternal Hearing, Seeing, and Speaking will be 
revealed in thee; and so God heareth and seeth through thee, being now the organ of 
His Spirit; and so God speaketh in thee, and whispereth to thy spirit, and thy spirit 
heareth his Voice.”83 "
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" Böhme seems to be writing quite clearly about the use of the same faculty as 
described by St. Paul in his Letter to the Corinthians and St. Symeon the New 
Theologian in the Discourses, and though threatened by various authorities for his 
writing, he was never excommunicated or charged with heresy. It thus seems that the 
faculty of intellectus was present (if not widely accepted) in early Lutheranism. It was 
not only in Lutheranism that a faculty resembling the nous or intellect was spoken of; 
Lady Anne Conway (1631-1679), a contemporary of Descartes and a Quaker 
associated with the Cambridge Platonists, wrote in The Principles of the Most Ancient 
and Modern Philosophy, “...those who are come unto a perfect Union with Christ, are 
mounted up into a Region or Sphere of perfect Tranquility, where nothing is seen or 
perceived to move or compel.”84 
 " The non-discursive faculty, though not a central topic for the leaders of the early 
Reformation, has been shown to nonetheless be present in the works of their followers. 
It seems, then, that the churches of the Reformation were quite far from a Cartesian 
anthropology, in many cases explicitly opposing central tenets of his philosophy. 
Whether or not these positions continued to be held by the churches of the Reformation, 
however, remains to be seen. 
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Section Eight: The Imposition of Cartesian Anthropology
" The history of Christianity since the lifetime of René Descartes is, as a subject, 
terrifyingly complex; the sheer number of leaders, doctrines and controversies that 
emerged from that time period is enormous. Attempting to track the changing 
conceptions of human faculties through each of the major branches that make up 
Western Christianity would be a simply monstrous (and quite possibly maddening) 
undertaking. Instead of attempting to follow individual trends, a few major documents 
and councils of the Roman Catholic Church and various Protestant bodies will serve as 
guideposts for belief, shedding light on widespread attitudes and assumptions about 
human personhood. 
" The first piece to be examined is the Westminster Confession of Faith, a 
foundational text for Reformed churches. The Westminster Confession, written during 
the lifetime of Descartes (1646), contains several sections regarding the faculties of the 
human person. Chapter VI, “Of the Fall of Man, of Sin, and the Punishment Thereof”, 
addresses the sin of Adam and Eve, stating, “By this sin they fell from their original 
righteousness and communion, with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly 
defiled in all the parts and faculties of soul and body.”85 The last section of that 
statement is immensely important for understanding Reformed or Calvinist opposition to 
a non-discursive faculty. Declaring all faculties to be “wholly defiled” serves as a de 
facto denial of the existence of the nous, as a non-discursive faculty, by definition, 
cannot be mistaken, fooled or turned askew. If the authors of the Westminster 
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Confession were to affirm the existence of a nous or intellectus, it would create a 
contradiction in their theology. 
" In the eighth chapter of the Westminster Confession, however, it does seem that 
the possibility for seeing God is retained in the Reformed tradition. “Of Sanctification” 
begins with the following claim: “They, who are once effectually called, and regenerated, 
having a new heart, and a new spirit created in them, are further sanctified, really and 
personally, through the virtue of Christ's death and resurrection, by His Word and Spirit 
dwelling in them: the dominion of the whole body of sin is destroyed, and the several 
lusts thereof are more and more weakened and mortified; and they more and more 
quickened and strengthened in all saving graces, to the practice of true holiness, 
without which no man shall see the Lord.”86 Though the faculty which man uses to “see 
the Lord” is not named in the Westminster Confession, the fact that it is associated with 
“true holiness” is, perhaps, meant to indicate that the state differs from normal modes of 
perception. 
" Chapter XXVI, “Of the Communion of Saints”, offers one more clue as to the 
nature of manʼs ability to commune with God, stating, “This communion which the saints 
have with Christ, does not make them in any wise partakers of the substance of His 
Godhead; or to be equal with Christ in any respect: either of which to affirm is impious 
and blasphemous.”87 The promise made in 2 Peter 1:4 (“...ye might be partakers of the 
divine nature...”88) seems to be in some tension with the first claim. 
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" The picture of human capacities that can be extracted from the Westminster 
Confession thus seems, at very least, to be more ambivalent than previous Christian 
statements regarding anthropology. The fourth chapter appears to exclude the faculty of 
intellectus from Reformed anthropology, but the prospect of seeing God mentioned in 
Chapter XIII perhaps leaves open the possibility of supra-rational perception. Though 
there are echoes of Descartes in the document (particularly in Chapter XXXII, which 
divides human persons strictly into bodies and souls), it cannot be said to be overtly 
Cartesian. Rather, an analysis of tenets within the Westminster Confession shows how 
Cartesian anthropology could appeal to a Protestant thinker. 
" Take, for instance, the apparent agreement between the Cartesian and Reformed 
traditions on the concept of self-knowledge, an accord formed by a convergence of 
thought rather than a common source. As the Westminster Confession clearly states, 
humans are said to be “...wholly defiled in all the parts and faculties of soul and body.”89 
All humans, however, have an inextricable experience of being a knowing subject, of 
being an “I”, which cannot be escaped. The eyes can be closed, the other senses (to 
some extent) ignored, but the state of subjectivity is impossible to escape in waking 
life.90 The Reformed tradition, in teaching that persons are “wholly defiled”, would also 
have to conclude that the identification of oneself as “real” or “persisting” is quite 
possibly incorrect; after all, if all parts of the person are defective, the judgements those 
parts produce could very well be defective. It is nigh impossible to doubt the validity of 
oneʼs experience of being a subject, however, as for the majority of the population, it 
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appears to coincide with all other experiences. For a Reformed thinker to function, then, 
the principle that oneʼs experience of being a knowing subject has validity must be 
accepted. The legitimacy of all other tenets of the faith, even the notion that one is 
“wholly defiled”, necessarily come after one has accepted the experience of being a 
subject as valid. A Reformed thinker can thus be sure of being a thinking being, but all 
other premises seem to be on shakier ground. One who has followed Reformed thinking 
on the notion of whole-defilement may thus end up in a state that seems to mirror a 
Cartesian skepticism, particularly the assertion that rationality is primary.91 
" This skepticism, as one might have guessed, may begin to provide an answer to 
one of the questions posed in the introduction. The skepticism of both Descartes and, 
apparently, the serious Reformed thinker, can lead one to acknowledge oneself as the 
ultimate arbiter of truth and falsehood. This conclusion, it would seem, could begin to 
explain a decline in recognition of Church authority, and ultimately, a decline in 
adherence. A feasible picture of how Cartesian anthropology might have been grafted 
into one branch of the Protestant tradition has thus been presented, but it requires 
further analysis and data in order to be proved or disproved. Before proceeding to that 
analysis, however, it is necessary to examine the councils that shaped modern thought 
in the other branch of Western Christianity, Roman Catholicism.
" The First Vatican Council (1869-1870), convened over two hundred years after 
the writing of the Westminster Confession, dedicated a substantial amount of time to 
delineating the scope and magisteria of rationality. The Third Session of the Council 
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issued a decree that, while blaming the Protestant Reformation for championing a 
rationality opposed to tradition, admits that foreign elements have infiltrated the Church. 
A section of that decree lays bare the situation: “Thereupon there came into being and 
spread far and wide throughout the world that doctrine of rationalism or naturalism, 
utterly opposed to the Christian religion, since this is of supernatural origin, which 
spares no effort to bring it about that Christ, who alone is our lord and savior, is shut out 
from the minds of people and the moral life of nations. Thus they would establish what 
they call the rule of simple reason or nature... With this impiety spreading in every 
direction, it has come about, alas, that many even among the children of the Catholic 
Church have strayed from the path of genuine piety, and as the truth was gradually 
diluted in them, their Catholic sensibility was weakened. Led away by diverse and 
strange teachings and confusing nature and grace, human knowledge and divine faith, 
they are found to distort the genuine sense of the dogmas which holy mother church 
holds and teaches, and to endanger the integrity and genuineness of the faith.”92  In 
admitting that perhaps even the attendees of the Council had had their Catholicism 
compromised by the philosophy of rationalism, the Council gives a picture of just how 
deeply Cartesian thought had permeated Western intellectual life. The First Vatican 
Council thus took as its mission the clarification of the Churchʼs stance on doctrine, 
essentially a process of identifying elements that were contrary to the traditional 
teachings of the church. This process necessarily included a restatement of the place of 
humans in the universe and an elucidation of human faculties. 
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" It is somewhat startling, therefore, to find that the Dogmatic Constitution on the 
Catholic Faith produced by the Third Session of that Council recognizes only two forms 
of knowledge. The fourth chapter of that text, “Faith and Reason”, divides knowledge 
into two categories, stating, “The perpetual agreement of the Catholic Church has 
maintained and maintains this too: that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct 
not only as regards its source, but also as regards its object. With regard to the source, 
we know at the one level by natural reason, at the other level by divine faith.”93 This 
claim appears patently false, even if one limits the scope to post-Schism authors in the 
West; surely Eckhart and Aquinas (in his private life) wrote of a sort of knowledge that 
qualified as neither faith nor reason. 
" One is tempted to assume that such a starkly reduced conception of human 
faculties is the product of a misinterpretation or translation error, but another chapter in 
the Constitution  seems to affirm the two-fold division of human capacities. “On 
Revelation” begins with the following words: “The same holy mother church holds and 
teaches that God, the source and end of all things, can be known with certainty from the 
consideration of created things, by the natural power of human reason: ever since the 
creation of the world, his invisible nature has been clearly perceived in the things that 
have been made. It was, however, pleasing to his wisdom and goodness to reveal 
himself and the eternal laws of his will to the human race by another, and that a 
supernatural, way.”94 The supernatural revelation which the text speaks of is, of course, 
the Incarnation. “On Revelation” thus allows that one can know of Godʼs existence via 
51
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
rational exercises and faith in the historical Incarnation of Christ, but the possibility of a 
non-discursive knowledge seems to again have been passed over. The First Vatican 
Council seems not only to have rejected the faculty of intellect, but even more 
provocatively, claimed that the Catholic Church had never acknowledged the validity of 
that knowledge. Though the Third Session of the Council affirmed that it was seeking to 
remove Cartesian rationalism95 from Church doctrine, it seems that it instead affirmed 
its validity and place in the Church. 
" If the First Vatican Council can be thought of as removing the intellectus from 
doctrine, it could be argued that the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) removed the 
intellectus from method or practice. Gaudium Et Spes, also known as the Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, one of the major documents produced 
by Vatican II, displays a rather bizarre back and forth description of human capacities. 
At some points, the text seems to return to the anthropology of the Church pre-Vatican I, 
only to pull back at the precipice of recognizing the intellectus. 
" The fifteenth section of Gaudium Et Spes is perhaps the best example of the 
uncomfortable meeting of antiquity and modernity, reading, “Man judges rightly by his 
intellect that he surpasses the material universe, for he shares in the light of the divine 
mind. By relentlessly employing his talents through the ages he has indeed made 
progress in the practical sciences and in technology and the liberal arts. In our times he 
has won superlative victories, especially in his probing of the material world and in 
subjecting it to himself. Still he has always searched for more penetrating truths, and 
finds them. For his intelligence is not confined to observable data alone, but can with 
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genuine certitude attain to reality itself as knowable, though in consequence of sin that 
certitude is partly obscured and weakened.”96
" The language of the document is more akin to an Enlightenment-era tome than 
any classical Christian text; man sharing “in the light of the divine mind” does not appear 
to mean anything more than man being capable of rational decision making. Though the 
Fall (retained as doctrine by the council, at least for the time being) has obscured manʼs 
vision, the optimistic tone of the passage suggests that even that can be overcome. 
" One might object to this portrayal of the Council; surely Gaudium Et Spes isnʼt 
that out of step with the rest of Church tradition? The tone and language might be 
“modernized”, but wasnʼt that the point of the Council being called? 
" The fifth section of Gaudium Et Spes shows that the Second Vatican Council not 
only updated the language of church documents, but actually altered doctrine. In the 
Christian tradition, the value of persons has always been connected with the 
mindfulness of God (“...what is mankind that you are mindful of them, human beings 
that you care for them?”97), as has the prospect of self-knowledge. Quite simply, true 
self-knowledge has been considered impossible outside of knowledge of God and vice 
versa. Gaudium Et Spes explicitly asserts to the contrary: “To a certain extent, the 
human intellect is also broadening its dominion over time: over the past by means of 
historical knowledge; over the future, by the art of projecting and by planning. Advances 
in biology, psychology, and the social sciences not only bring men hope of improved 
self-knowledge; in conjunction with technical methods, they are helping men exert direct 
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influence on the life of social groups.”98 Whereas the first statement seemed to be a 
modern sentiment cloaked in traditional vocabulary, the second is thoroughly 
progressive in word and spirit. The sentiment expressed is, of course, a Cartesian one, 
one which is directly opposed by the full brunt of Church tradition. 
" The Second Vatican Council did not merely alter Church doctrine on 
anthropology and epistemology, but also instantiated these changes into its practices. 
The most prominent example of this is the introduction of Novus Ordo mass, the liturgy 
called for in the Sacrosanctum Concilium.99 When viewed in conjunction with the 
anthropological devolution of that Council, the nature of the changes made to the mass 
seem to reflect a Cartesian anthropology: the change from Latin to the colloquial 
language indicates that a rational grasp of statements expressed in the liturgy is 
considered necessary, the posture and placement of the priest reflects rational dialogue 
rather than worship, etc.  The source of these changes were understood by some of the 
more intellectual Catholics and received much criticism; it is said that the British writer 
J.R.R. Tolkien “...found the innovations too much for him. Disappointed by changes in 
the Mass's language and the informality of the ritual, he rose from his seat, made his 
way laboriously to the aisle, made three low bows and stomped out.”100 As the statistical 
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decline discussed in the introduction shows, it appears that many more since have 
followed Tolkienʼs example.
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Section Nine: The Present and Future of the Christian West
" Having conducted an analysis of Christian anthropology throughout history, it is 
now possible to judge the present condition of the Christian West by the standard of its 
former self. Western Christianity is not only going through a period of statistical decline 
and fragmentation (as the introduction showed), but is also experiencing a time of 
doctrinal deviation, and almost as troubling, moral confusion. Consider the following 
situation: while the Second Vatican Council seems to have shrouded some of its 
anthropological claims in (at best) ambiguous terms, Gaudium Et Spes very clearly 
exhorts its readers to respect “the dignity of the human person”. Chapter II of Gaudium 
Et Spes features a list of violations of that dignity, including “...any type of murder, 
genocide, abortion... all these things and others of their like are infamies indeed.”101 
These sentiments are in keeping with Church tradition and, as such, elicit no great 
attention. 
" The largest body of Lutherans in the United States, however, apparently holds a 
different opinion. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America adopted a statement on 
abortion in 1991102 that includes the following lines: "This church recognizes that there 
can be sound reasons for ending a pregnancy through induced abortion... What is 
determined to be a morally responsible decision in one situation may not be in 
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another."103 As it is difficult to imagine Martin Luther condoning such a statement, one 
may conclude that the Church that bears his name has adopted a different model of 
faith.
" The wild divergence between past and present is not confined to the ELCA; the 
Episcopal Church, mentioned to be in the midst of an internal lawsuit at the beginning of 
this thesis, declared in 1994 that “[n]o one shall be denied access to the selection 
process for ordination in this church because of race, color, ethnic origin, national origin, 
marital status, sexual orientation, disabilities or age...”104 Though one might look upon 
the institution of a non-discrimination clause as admirable, the actual language is 
bordering on the absurd; surely the Episcopal Church is not prepared to ordain toddlers 
to the priesthood. Considering the dearth of characteristics that could disqualify one for 
ordination, it seems appropriate to question whether or not explicit religious belief will be 
required for ordination in the future.105
" From the perspective of a traditionalist Christian, things look rather bleak. All of 
the information gathered concerning anthropology throughout Christian history suggests 
that the conception of human faculties promoted by René Descartes has been grafted 
into the doctrine of Western Christian denominations. The faculty which was so 
pervasive in the early period of the Church, the intellectus, has apparently gone out of 
fashion. The consequence of this rejection is actually quite predictable; it seems likely 
that the pious souls remaining within Western denominations would revert to sub-
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rationality, for “...the states below reason and the states above it have, by their common 
contrast to the life we know, a certain superficial resemblance.”106 The rise of the mega-
church in America serves as evidence for such a claim, with their increasing power 
perhaps connected with the conflict between the desire for supra-rational knowledge 
and a Cartesian anthropology. One could also expect a portion of adherents to retain a 
belief in the ability of humans to know God but lose faith in the Christian religion, a 
sentiment which might explain the societal fascination with “Eastern” religions that 
began in the 1960ʼs. 
" Though the historical trail of documents suggests that Western Christian 
anthropology was greatly influenced by the work of René Descartes, it is actually the 
state of churches in the modern West that seems to confirm this. It could be expected 
that the imposition of Cartesian anthropology on a religious body would, ultimately, lead 
to the fragmentation of that group, for this reason: the Cartesian necessarily seems 
himself as the ultimate judge of the truth of a fact or circumstance. 
" The solipsistic emphasis of Descartesʼ system makes all concepts, objects and 
persons less real than the knowing subject; frankly, if a person can only be fully 
convinced of their own (limited) existence, it seems likely that the aforementioned 
person would be more likely to be guided by their own council rather than that of 
another (potentially unreal) person. The number and increasing frequency of schisms in 
the Church since the time of Descartes seems to indicate that his philosophy has, in 
fact, permeated all levels of Western society. 
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" As Descartesʼ conception of the human person removes the intellectus from the 
list of faculties, it would also be sensible to assume that a Cartesian anthropology would 
manifest itself by placing great emphasis on the rational and emotional realms and next 
to none on the noetic. The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the largest 
Lutheran body in North America, releases regular statements regarding the nature of 
gender identity and the like, but includes absolutely no information regarding the nature 
of spiritual practice in itʼs “Theological Discernment Resources”.107 Likewise, the 
Episcopal Church does not include “encouraging the direct knowledge of God” or any 
analogous statement under its “Five Marks of Mission”, but does state its dedication to 
“...transform[ing] unjust structures of society, to challenge[ing] violence of every kind 
and to pursu[ing] peace and reconciliation.”108
" A defender of Western churches might allow that they are indeed declining in 
Western Europe and North America, but what, they might ask, is one to make of the 
growth of churches in Africa? A World Council of Churches Report from August of 2004 
estimated that there would be over 600,000,000 Christians in Africa by 2025.109 Surely 
this astounding growth is indicative of some sort of Western Christian revival?
" One hoping to hear of a looming re-birth in the Christian West will, unfortunately, 
be disappointed by the reality of the situation. Sub-Saharan Africa, the area in which this 
supposed “boom” is occurring, has been alternately ignored and exploited by the 
peoples of Western Europe since its discovery; the story of Leopold II of Belgium offers 
59
107 "Theological Discernment." Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2014.
108 "The Five Marks of Mission." Episcopal Church. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Apr. 2014.
109 "World Council of Churches." World Council of Churches. N.p., n.d. Web. 10 Apr. 2014. <http://
www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents>.
a wonderful case-study. This process has resulted in very little Western-style education 
being available to the peoples living within that area. By virtue of having the entirety of 
the Western academic corpus withheld, it follows that the peoples of Sub-Saharan 
Africa have largely avoided contact with the work of Rene Descartes and other 
rationalist philosophers. 
" The new Christians in that area are thus free from holding a Cartesian 
anthropology, but how “Christian” they actually are is debatable. The process of 
evangelization is, by-and-large, not being carried out by the traditional churches of the 
West, but by grass-roots efforts within the area. This can create a rather puzzling 
situation, as though “...a majority of Africans today regard themselves as ʻChristian,ʼ 
standard definitions are hard pressed to accommodate on-the-ground realities. 
Frequently, comfortably established old Christendom formulations and practices have 
been displaced by much that is unfamiliar and even shocking.”110 It is thus unlikely that 
this growing body of African Christians is knowledgable of the traditional anthropology of 
the Christian faith, much less actively seeking to employ the faculty of intellectus. 
" There is, however, one branch of Christianity which does continue to speak of a 
non-discursive faculty, one which is actually growing in the United States. The caveat is 
this: itʼs not the traditional church of the West. The Eastern Orthodox branch of 
Christianity reportedly grew by 16% in the United States during the period between 
2000 and 2010, a rate that seems remarkable when compared to the statistics included 
in the introduction.111 Its growth could be attributed to its being largely free of the central 
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problems of the modern Christian West: as neither the Renaissance nor Enlightenment 
greatly impacted life in traditionally Orthodox lands, the anthropology held by the 
Eastern Church remains remarkably like that of the early church. Orthodoxy is, of 
course, beset by many problems, not the least of which are ethnophyletism and 
corruption; however, the relative dearth of socio-political problems makes the situation 
very attractive to the Western traditionalist. 
" The practice of contemplative prayer, of activating the non-discursive faculty and 
seeing the uncreated light of God, is not relegated to the status of “tower activity” in 
Orthodoxy, but is celebrated in the Church. St. Gregory Palamasʼs defense of the 
practice of Hesychasm is the focal point of the second Sunday of Lent each year and is 
considered to be a continuation of the Triumph of Orthodoxy, celebrated on the first 
Sunday of Lent. This arrangement makes a strong statement concerning the ability of 
man to see God; namely, that to deny it is heresy. 
" It seems, after a survey of theological and philosophical changes throughout the 
last two millennia, that the East is the only place left for the Christian of a classical 
disposition.112 It can be somewhat disheartening to realize that Christendom has 
passed, that the old standard-bearer is dead, but the Western Christian must look at it 
as a necessary step in the history of man. Things of the earth were not built to last, but 
this truth should not be the cause of unexpected heartache; after all, Christ told his 
disciples in the Gospel of John, “In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good 
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cheer; I have overcome the world.”113 The noetic vision is still available, at least for a 
time, in the East; how long it will remain available is anyoneʼs guess. 
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